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This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of the time allocation of en-
trepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide
random-sample survey ofmore than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities inChina,
we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violation of property rights, spend
large proportions of their working time on lobbying activities to protect their busi-
nesses at a cost to management time. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to
property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected
or if the firm is larger or older.
These ex-communist countries are advised to move to a market
economy . . . but without the appropriate institutions no market
economy of any significance is possible. . . . [T]he interrelationships
which govern the mix of market and hierarchy . . . are extremely
complex. . . . What we need is more empirical work.
(Coase 1991)
I. Introduction
Institutions, specifically property rights andcontracting institutions, are re-
garded as conditions that enable markets to function (Smith [1776] 1981;
We acknowledge comments from the ConferenceHonoringNobel Laureate Ronald Coase
on Receiving Honorary Doctorate from the State University of New York at Buffalo, two ref-
erees, and in particular SamPeltzman.We follow the Coasian tradition, which refers to his view
that economics is a study of the economy as it actually operates in the real world, and his ap-
proach to empirical work, which focuses on understanding a variety of unknown institutions
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North 1981). Althoughconceptual or theoretical arguments have beenpre-
sented, systematic evidence became available only recently. Empirical stud-
ies show that stronger property rights protection and contract enforcement
promote firm performance, enhance corporate governance and corporate
innovation (La Porta et al. 2000; Klapper and Love 2004), and encourage
firm growth and reinvestment (Besley 1995; Johnson,McMillan, andWood-
ruff 2002; Cull and Xu 2005), thereby promoting economic growth (Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). Most
studies analyze the effect of institutions on the performance outcomes or
strategies of firms, but little is known about a more basic mechanism for
the effects of institutions on the effort exertion of entrepreneurs.
This study attempts to fill this knowledge gap; that is, we analyze entre-
preneurs’ responses in their time allocation to institutional constraints,
particularly the insecurity of private property rights, on the basis of a na-
tionwide random-sample survey conducted in China. The data set we use
covers detailed information on the time allocation of entrepreneurs and
distinguishes among their time devoted to work and leisure and time al-
located to different activities at work. We analyze the relationships of in-
stitutional constraints with the time devoted to management and lobby-
ing activities by decomposing time allocation of entrepreneurs at work.
In this paper, “lobbying”means activities seeking to influence local gov-
ernments to protect the businesses of individual entrepreneurs, and it is
not about influencing legislators or lawmaking. In China, entrepreneurs
are not allowed to organize themselves for political representation inde-
pendently from the party-state, which makes decisions on laws and regu-
lations. Therefore, the lobbying activities of entrepreneurs mainly target
the arbitrary decisions of local governments, which are not subject to rules
or laws, to protect their own businesses.
Time allocation is critically important for entrepreneurs of small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Becker (1965) and the follow-up liter-
ature focus on the trade-offs that individuals make between work and lei-
sure, that is, working- versus nonworking-time allocation.1 However, the
process involved in allocating time within the working time of entrepre-
1 Becker (1965) introduces the “household production function,” which studies the sub-
stitution effect of the growth in productivity of working and its trade-off with consumption
time loss. However, Pollak and Wachter (1975) argue that joint production results in the
confounding of tastes and technology within shadow prices. Empirical studies indicate that
self-employed people report higher job satisfaction than regular employees even when they
work longer hours and earn lower wages than employees (Benz and Frey 2004). At the same
time, despite their lower pay and rate of promotion, women are more satisfied with their
jobs than men (Clark 1997). Social norms and peer pressure may also affect an individual’s
time allocation to paid work, voluntary work, and leisure (Freeman 1997; Fehr and Falk
2002; Akerlof and Kranton 2005).
and their influences. Financial support from the Research Grants Council (RGC) Theme-
BasedResearchScheme (project T31-717112-R) and theRGCGeneralResearchFund (project
756711) are acknowledged. All errors are our own.
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neurs has received significantly less attention. This issue is particularly
relevant to entrepreneurs of SMEs, whonormally have less developedman-
agement teams and social networks. Balancing the efforts exerted on dif-
ferent activities is important for entrepreneurs because it could deter-
mine the survival and growth of firms. In the few studies on the time
allocation of entrepreneurs,2 the effects of institutions on time allocation
of entrepreneurs are largely ignored in economics literature.
Interaction between institutions and time allocation is important, as in-
stitutions influence entrepreneurs’ trade-offs when they allocate their time
andefforts amongdifferent tasks (HolmstromandMilgrom1991;Dewatri-
pont, Jewitt, and Tirole 1999, 2000),3 particularly among productive and
nonproductive activities. A major premise of the multitask theory is that
all efforts of individuals at work are productive. However, this presumption
does not necessarily stand when entrepreneurs face institutional impedi-
ments that distort the time allocation of talents (Acemoglu 1995; Acemo-
glu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005) and affect their efforts in daily work. En-
trepreneurs are induced to pursue rent-seeking rather than creating new
knowledge or products because they have to spend time lobbying to gain
government-controlled resources (Tullock 1967; Baumol 1990). However,
studies on the interaction between institutions and multitask issues are
restricted to theory. To our knowledge, no systematic empirical study has
investigated the relationships between institutions and time allocation to
management and lobbying efforts.
China provides an interesting case for studying trade-offs (costs and
benefits) faced by entrepreneurs when they allocate time to different tasks
to address institutional impediments. The private sector4 in China began
from scratch in the 1990s because it was completely illegal not long ago.
Thanks to rapid growth and privatization, the private sector now comprises
approximately 40 million registered private businesses and 34.07 million
individually owned businesses. These businesses accounted for more than
half of China’s GDP by the end of 2010. Private property rights are fully
legalized in principle since the constitutional amendments of 2004. Allow-
ing and recognizing private property rights are important improvements
over previous conditions, explaining a large part of China’s growth.
2 McCarthy, Krueger, and Schoenecker (1990) and Fischer and Reuber (1997) examine
the changing time-allocation patterns of entrepreneurs as firms move from one stage of de-
velopment to another. Cooper, Ramachandran, and Schoorman (1997) find that craftsmen-
entrepreneurs devote less time to administrative activities than entrepreneurs with manage-
rial experience. Verheul, Carree, and Thurik (2009) find that female entrepreneurs invest
less time in the business than male entrepreneurs.
3 Lucas and Moll (2011) study the effects of multitasking on growth. In their model,
agents divide their time between production and learning activities, which determine real
economic growth.
4 A narrowly defined private sector refers to registered private businesses and individu-
ally owned businesses. A broadly defined private sector refers to all non–state-owned enter-
prises, including the narrowly defined private businesses, collectively owned enterprises,
and foreign enterprises. In this study, we focus on the narrowly defined private sector.
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However, not surprisingly, property rights protection remains weak, and
the violation of property rights is prevalent, among the major problems
that China faces. One of the major forms of property rights violation is the
arbitrary levies imposed on private firms by local governments. Most of these
arbitrary levies are not formal taxes. Instead, they are imposed by local gov-
ernments arbitrarily, without justification by laws, and in complete absence
of citizens’ consent. From time to time, even the Chinese central govern-
ment condemns these levies as “irrational,” “extralegal,” or even “illegal.”5
According to a classic principle of property rights and taxation, charging
levies without citizens’ consent—for example, the approval of the citizens’
representatives—or without legal support is a violation of property rights.
“[T]he supreme power [i.e., the government] cannot take from any man
any part of his property [e.g., collecting taxes] without his own consent.
For the preservation of property being the end of government” (Locke
[1689] 1823, p. 165). This principle is not only followed by generations of
leading scholars, such as Smith ([1776] 1981) andNorth (1981), but is also
the basis for constitutions of all democracies. When this rule is breached
and governments violate property rights, entrepreneurs have to exert extra
effort to deal with these institutional obstacles at a cost to their time and
effort in management activities. The nature of these problems faced by
Chinese entrepreneurs is similar to those discussed by Adam Smith when
he stated that property rights institutions affect entrepreneurship.6
This study investigates the effects of institutional impediments on the
allocation of time (effort) of entrepreneurs in modern China. We model
an entrepreneur’s time-effort allocation problemwhen subjected to a prop-
erty rights protection constraint. Analytically, this model extends Becker’s
(1965)model by adding an institutional constraint. In ourmodel, the time
of an entrepreneur is allocated between leisure and work, which is further
allocated betweenmanagement and lobbying time for protecting property
rights and dealing with related matters. We theoretically show that entre-
preneurs devote more time to lobbying activities when property rights pro-
tection is weaker. Moreover, entrepreneurs’ political connectionsmay im-
prove lobbying efficiency, such that the sensitivity of lobbying efforts to
property rights protection is moderated.
The above-mentioned theoretical hypotheses are tested empirically. We
find that property rights institutions significantly affect the time allocation
5 The Chinese economy relies heavily on subnational governments, including fiscal and
financial aspects (Xu 2011). However, the central government takes most of the tax reve-
nues from local governments, so that local governments have to find other sources of rev-
enue. Thus, extralegal levies have become important revenue sources for local govern-
ments and have grown rapidly in the past 2 decades.
6 “Commerce andmanufactures can seldomflourish long in any state which does not en-
joy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in
the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and
in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the
payment of debts from all those who are able to pay” (Smith [1776] 1981, 910).
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of entrepreneurs at work. In particular, entrepreneurs of firms that are
charged with higher levies, that is, are sufferingmore severe property rights
violation, tend to allot more time to lobbying activities, thus costing time
used for management activities. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time
to property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically
connected or if the firm is larger or older.
To identify the causal relationship between property rights protection
and the time entrepreneurs devote to lobbying activities, we conduct two-
stage estimations with two instrumental variables (IVs) to address poten-
tial omitted-variable bias and endogeneity issues. The first IV refers to the
weights of provincial-government policies on nonstate sectors. The sec-
ond IVrefers to the efforts of provincial-level governments in fighting cor-
ruption.We suggest that both IVs are good predictors of whether the local
firms will be charged with higher levies or not, whereas neither IV should
be related to error terms of the estimations of the individual time alloca-
tion of entrepreneurs. Moreover, we apply the overidentification strategy
by using two IVs that allow us to statistically test the relevance and exo-
geneity of the IVs. The two-stage estimations confirm that our IVs are sat-
isfactory and our empirical findings are robust.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section II describes the
institutional background of private property rights protection and lobby-
ing activities of entrepreneurs in China. Section III introduces the analyt-
ical framework. Section IV provides information on data and definitions
of variables. Section V reports empirical findings. Section VI concludes
the study.
II. Property Rights Institutions and Lobbying Activities
of Entrepreneurs
During the prereform era in China, private ownership was completely il-
legal. The economic reform launched in 1978 did not have an agenda to
allow for private ownership, as this contradicts socialist ideology.7 Through-
out the reform anddevelopment process, lingering institutional and ideo-
logical biases against the private sector remained. Thedevelopment of the
private sector and privatization has been gradually tolerated since the 1990s,
when the state sector became mired in deep trouble, whereas privately
owned firms were still not granted de jure rights (Xu 2011). The de facto
private sector took off rapidly after 1997, when de facto privatization was
permitted officially.8 Since then, the private sector underwent significant
7 Private enterprises were not formally permitted to exist until 1988, with the enactment
of the Private Enterprise Administration Act, which was enacted 10 years after the start of
the economic reform. However, even then, the constitution did not recognize private prop-
erty rights.
8 The Partnership Enterprise Law and the Sole Proprietorship Enterprise Law were en-
acted in 1997 and 1999, respectively.
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development before the constitutional recognition of private ownership,
which happened in 2004.
The share of the private sector in the total GDP increased from 2.5 per-
cent in 1998 to nearly 50 percent in 2009. With its rapid growth rate, the
private sectorhas become the largest engine of economic growth inChina.
By the end of 2011, the private sector comprised approximately 9.68 mil-
lion registered private businesses and 37.56 million individually owned
businesses. Moreover, more than 160 million jobs, or 90 percent of the
new jobs in the nation, had been created by the private sector by the end
of 2011 (Yearbook of China Private Economy 2012).
Nonetheless, the institutions under which the private sector operates
remain far from favorable. The protection of property rights remains
poor because of the weak law enforcement (Clarke, Murrell, andWhiting
2008). Anecdotes show that local governments may confiscate the wealth
of private firms within their jurisdictions. Gong Jialong, former chairman
of theTianfaGroup, whichwas the largest Chinese private oil company, was
detained for alleged economic crimes in 2006. After one year and 7months
of trial, Gongwas released andwas foundnot guilty.However, his oil empire
was swiftly broken up, and most of the businesses were sold to state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) at a government auction during his absence.9 In other
high-profile legal cases related to private businesses, entrepreneurs were
not as fortunate as Gong; that is, they not only lost their assets but also were
sentenced to long imprisonment or evendeath, for example, LouHengwei,
Xu Ronghua, Zhu Menghe, Feng Yongming, and Yang Jinde.10
One of themost prevalent government expropriations is in the form of
various nontax levies, charges, and fines applied to firms. These levies are
arbitrary and are not based on formal rules or laws. Government revenues
consist of three major types: budgetary revenue, extrabudgetary revenue
(EBR), andnonbudgetary revenue (NBR;Wong 1997; Brown 1998).Of the
three types, EBR and NBR are the main sources of local-government reve-
nue. In 2006, EBR andNBR amounted to RMB640.79 billion (3.02 percent
of total GDP) and comprised 93.2 percent of the total local-government
spending in that year (China National Statistical Yearbook 2008). Most EBR
and NBR are collected in the forms of nontax levies.
Local governments have high discretionary power in imposing levies,
fees, and other burdens, as these levies are not regulated by laws or legis-
lators. Self-collection and self-utilization policies for EBR andNBR encour-
age local governments to collect nontax levies. Nationwide, approximately
7,600 types of nontax levies were documented before July 2007, among
which only 30 had a precise legal basis, 400 were justified by certain regu-
9 “Former China Oil Tycoon Plots Return with Canadian Gas Venture” (Reuters, March 18,
2014; http://www.reuters.com/article/china-tycoon-gas-idUSL3N0LV30N20140318).
10 “Private Enterprises Are Facing theRisk of Justice” (The Economic Observer, November 2,
2011; in Chinese).
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lations or policies, and 7,100 were imposed by local governments without
legal justification.11 In taking Anhui Province as an example, 24,441 gov-
ernment agencies at different levels in the province charged 438 items of
nontax levies that accounted for RMB9.52 billion (34.7 percent of the local
revenues) in 2004.12 These nontax levies and charges arbitrarily imposed by
various government departments are common ways of government expro-
priation, rent-seeking by corrupt officials, or both, and they lower the secu-
rity of property rights (Lin, Lin, and Zou 2012).
Zong Qinghou, the chairman of the largest domestic beverage and food
producer and the second-richestman inChina, according to the Forbes “rich
list,” stressed that his Wahaha Group pays more than 400 different gov-
ernment administrative charges each year.13 According to the Nationwide
Survey on Enterprise Burdens conducted by China Center for Promotion
of SME Development (a government agency under the Ministry of Indus-
try and Information Technology), the burden of the levies can be as high
as 80 percent of the net profit. Concretely, by average, 4.1 percent of the
total revenue of the enterprises was paid as nontax levies in 2012.14 As a
comparison, the average tax was 7.8 percent, whereas the net profit of the
firms was 5.1 percent of the total revenue.15 Another survey, conducted
by theNational Development andReformCommission of the State Coun-
cil, shows that the illegal fees charged by banks accounted for 15 percent
of the total costs of corporate bank loans in 2012.16
Facing high levy burdens at the discretion of the local governments,
that is, the expropriation of property rights, entrepreneurs have to make
substantial efforts to lobby local governments to protect their businesses.
Feng Lun, chairman of Vantone Group, one of the largest private estate
developers in China, reported that two-thirds of the 180 business trips he
made in 2011 were lobbying related.17 In addition to becoming acquainted
with and bribing government officials, successful entrepreneurs often are
more creative than others in lobbying, in terms of whom to lobby, what to
lobby, and how to lobby.Wang Jianlin, whowas ranked as the richest entre-
preneur in China in 2013 and 2014, asserted in his lecture at the Harvard
Business School that “cultivating intimate relationships with the govern-
11 For details, see “Act on Administrative Fees: Why Do We Have to Wait for So Long?”
(Democracy and Rule of Law Weekly [minzhu yu fazhi zhoukan], November 14, 2007).
12 For details, see http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/4111634.html (in Chinese).
13 For details, see “WahahaBossUrges Tax Cuts to Lift Growth” (South ChinaMorning Post, Au-
gust 25, 2014; http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170118/50596552_0.shtml (in Chinese).
14 http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20161221/15092384_0.shtml (in Chinese).
15 The average ratio of the levies reported in the survey conducted in 2012 is significantly
higher than that reported in the survey we used in this study, which was conducted in 2006.
This finding is consistent with the anecdotes reported bymass media that the burdens from
levies have been significantly increased in recent years.
16 For details, see http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0925/c1004-23025543.html
(in Chinese).
17 For details, see http://finance.ifeng.com/business/renwu/20130128/7610444.shtml
(in Chinese).
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ment in China is more difficult than conducting a post-doc research at
Harvard.”18
Finding ways to protect property rights is an essential task for entrepre-
neurs. Besides direct lobbying efforts, entrepreneursmay also cultivate po-
litical connections for protection.19 Indeed,more thanone-third of the pri-
vate firms in our sample are owned by veteran party members who were
well connected to the government even before starting a private business.
This study attempts to capture how entrepreneurs allocate their time to
lobbying andmanagement activities, depending on the institutional issues
they face and the political connections they have.
III. Analytical Framework
Our analytical framework is based onBecker (1965) and inspired byNorth
(1981), Acemoglu (1995), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). We study
the allocation of time or efforts by entrepreneurs tomaximize utility when
property rights are not secure. The time of the entrepreneur is allocated
between leisure and work, which is further divided betweenmanagement
and lobbying time to protect property rights and deal with related mat-
ters. We formally denote the utility function U ðy, ‘Þ, where y is income,
and ‘ is leisure. The utility function satisfies the usual conditions; that is,
ðy=yyÞU 5 U1 > 0, ðy=y‘ÞU 5 U2 > 0, U11 < 0, U22 < 0, and U12 5 U21 > 0.
Total endowed time T will be allocated between working time, h, and
leisure time, ‘. That is, ‘ 5 T 2 h. Total working time consists of manage-
ment and lobbying time, that is h 5 m 1 r. The income, y, of the entre-
preneur, as the largest owner of the firm, consists of a profit share of the
firm and wealth. We denote the ownership share of the entrepreneur as
a and wealth as W. We assume that the profit of the firm is a function of
the entrepreneur’s working hours, that is, ym, where y is the marginal
productivity of m. Thus, the budget constraint of the entrepreneur is y 5
aym 1 W .
To capture the entrepreneur’s loss due to insecure property rights, we
assume that a fraction J, where J ∈ ½0, 1, of the disposable income of the
entrepreneur from thefirm, xðh, rÞ, will be taken by the local government.
This deductionmay include local-government-imposed levies, other bur-
dens, partial confiscations, and so on. We suppose that an entrepreneur
can mitigate the loss by lobbying the local government. A simple way to
18 For details, see http://money.163.com/12/0919/17/8BPITLLM00253G87_all.html
(text; in Chinese) and http://www.wanda.cn/2013/chairman_0724/28.html (video; in Chi-
nese).
19 A stream of literature studies the different effects of entrepreneurs’ political connec-
tions on the performance and accessibility to bank loans of the firms (Peng and Luo 2000;
Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007; Li et al. 2008; Francis, Hasan, and Sun 2009). In particular,
Guo et al. (2014) find the 2004 constitutional amendment to be a turning point: politically
connected entrepreneurs have obtained significantlymore bank loans than other entrepre-
neurs since then.
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model this situation is that ð1 2 rÞJ of the disposable income of the firm
will be taken by the local government; that is, an entrepreneur’s lobbying
activity r can reduce the loss. Thus, the institutional constraint is
x h, rð Þ 5 1 2 1 2 rð ÞJ½ y h 2 rð Þ: (1)
The institutional constraint captures an entrepreneur’s lobbying activ-
ities for reducing his levies, which is different from lobbying for changing
taxation. First, levies, J, are different from taxation because taxation is
determined exogenously by the national government, and lobbying from
individual entrepreneurs will not affect it. Second, in ourmodel, the local
authority has no right to set up or change taxation systems. Ownership
share a can be interpreted partly as a tax to some extent, which is a fixed
rule set up and enforced exogenously such that the entrepreneur is un-
able to influence the measure.
In this economy, the entrepreneur allocates total working time h and
lobbying time r tomaximize utility, subject to institutional constraint. That
is,
maxh,rU ax h, rð Þ 1 W , T 2 hð Þ, (2)
subject toequation(1).Trade-offsbetweenmanaging thefirmandaddress-
ing institutional constraints affect the way the entrepreneur allocates to-
tal working time versus leisure and the amount of lobbying time r that the
entrepreneur will spend protecting property rights. From equation (1),
we have the marginal productivity of working hour h,
xh 5 1 2 1 2 rð ÞJ½ y: (3)
It shows that when institutional cost J increases, marginal productivity of
total working hours decreases. We also have the marginal productivity of
lobbying time r,
xr 5 J 1 hJ 2 2Jr 2 1ð Þy: (4)
Substituting constraint condition (1) into the objective function, the first-
order condition of program (2) with respect to h and r is aU 1xh 5 U2 5
aU 1xr. Thus, at optimum,
U2
U1
5 axh 5 axr: (5)
From equations (3)–(5) we have
1 2 1 2 rð ÞJ 5 J 1 hJ 2 2Jr 2 1: (6)
From equation (6), we can obtain yr=yJ > 0, a comparative static result
characterizing the equilibrium behavior of the entrepreneur. One of
the major observable variables that measure violation of property rights
is the arbitrary levy imposed by local governments on entrepreneurs. Em-
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pirically, we interpret J as the levy. Thus, we have the following empirical
predictions.
Hypothesis 1. Everything else being equal, the heavier the levy J im-
posed on the entrepreneur, the more lobbying time r (or the less man-
agement time h 2 r) spent by the entrepreneur.
In addition to spending time in lobbying activities, political connections
may also be important inprovidingprotection to entrepreneurs by improv-
ing lobbying efficiency. Inourhighly stylized simplemodel, this is captured
by political connections or lobbying efficiency, z, in the institution con-
straint as follows:
x h, rð Þ 5 1 2 1 2 zrð ÞJ½ y h 2 rð Þ, (7)
where z > 1 for politically connected entrepreneurs and z 5 1 otherwise.
Thus, lobbying time r increases when J increases, but increases less forpo-
litically connected entrepreneurs than for others because they have higher
productivity, z, in their lobbying activities.
Hypothesis 2. Everything else being equal, the heavier the levy, J,
the more lobbying time r (or less management time h 2 r) an entrepre-
neur will spend. Moreover, for politically connected entrepreneurs r will
increase less (ormanagement time h2 rwill decrease less) than for other
entrepreneurs.
IV. Data and Variables
Data used in this study are obtained from the Survey of China’s Private
Enterprises. This survey was conducted in 2006 via a stratified random-
sample survey approach.To ensure representativeness of the data, the pop-
ulation of private firms was stratified by location (i.e., provinces, cities/
counties), stage of economic development, urban and rural locations,
and industry. The sample size of the survey is 3,837. The firms surveyed
are located in 109 cities, equivalent to roughly one-third of Chinese cities.
Survey data were collected via face-to-face interviews. The survey pro-
vides a broad range of information on the governance of entrepreneurial
firms; interactions among private business activities and institutions, such
as local governments, local courts, and regulations; and other factors. En-
trepreneurs were asked to report on the ways they allocate time and on
other subjects, for example, finance and governance of their firms. The
survey collected sociodemographic characteristics of the entrepreneurs.
The survey’s sampling scheme was carefully designed for representa-
tiveness. However, data collection was organized by or with the assistance
of the government.20 Thus, the samplemay have potential bias in that, com-
20 The survey was designed by sociologists and organized by the United Front Work De-
partment of the Communist Part of China Central Committee, the National Association of
Industry andCommerce, the State Administration for Industry andCommerce, and the Pri-
vate Economy Academy of China.
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pared with all firms in the population, the sampled entrepreneursmay be
closer to the government. Consequently, the actual problem in the overall
population might be more severe than what we uncovered from the sur-
vey sample.
Time allocation of entrepreneurs is the major type of variable in this
study. The survey asked entrepreneurs for detailed information on the
amount of time they devoted to different activities per day, including work
and leisure. When entrepreneurs were asked to report their normal work-
ing hours, they were asked to specify the time they devoted to manage-
ment activities, networking activities,21 and learning per day. That is, the
total working time consists of three components.We sum these three com-
ponents and build a variable for total working hours. The variable “Work_
time” is the total number of hours the entrepreneur devotes to manage-
ment, networking, and learning activities per day, which distinguishes
the time allocation of the entrepreneur between work and leisure. Our
major interests are the ratio of time spent in lobbying activities over total
working time, “Lobby_Rt,” and the ratio of time allotted to management
activities over total working time, “Mng_Rt.” Table 1 shows that the sam-
pled entrepreneurs work for 12.48 hours per day, on average. On average,
respondents spend 3.26 hours, that is, more than 26 percent of their work-
ing time, on lobbying activities; 7.5 hours, that is, about 60 percent of their
working time, onmanagement; and 1.40 hours on study during their work-
ing hours. It is worth noting that, on average, the time allocated to lobbying
and management activities accounts for over 86 percent of the total work-
ing hours of entrepreneurs. The figure suggests that the increase in lobby-
ing efforts normally may come at a cost to the management efforts of the
entrepreneurs. Therefore, in many cases, we should expect Mng_Rt and
Lobby_Rt to be mirror images. Indeed, our model predicts that the viola-
tion of property rights drives entrepreneurs to exert more effort toward
lobby activities, at a cost to managing the business. We therefore maintain
themirror imageof the two variables in all estimations tohighlight the con-
siderable significance of the costs.
In terms of institutional impediments, we focus on the violation of prop-
erty rights. As mentioned above, local governments impose various levies
on entrepreneurs. In the survey, entrepreneurs were asked to report the
total amount of all levies paid to the government beyond tax in the previ-
ous year. We use this information to construct our measurement for prop-
erty rights violation. We first calculate the ratio of fees over sales for each
firm (“Forced_fee”). On the basis of this ratio, we construct the variable
“High_fee,” a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the high-
est 25 percent of Forced_fee and zero otherwise. Table 1 shows that on
average, firms pay 0.6 percent of their total sales to local governments as
21 As the survey was conducted by official agencies, the term “networking” is used. How-
ever, most “networking” in China’s context is about building connections with the govern-
ment for lobbying purposes.
Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation 407
additional fees. However, this ratio has a highly skewed distribution. Cer-
tain firms pay considerably more than others, such that the median is less
than the average, the standard deviation is larger than the mean, and the
maximum Forced_fee is 11.5 percent.
To prevent our estimations from being driven by omitted variables, we
control for entrepreneur and firm characteristics as well as for region and
industry effects. Regional effects are measured by a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the province is defined as an “economically developed
province” by the Chinese National Statistical Bureau in 2006 and zero oth-
erwise. Industry effect is captured by industry dummy variables that iden-
tify the industries of the firm. Detailed definitions of the variables are in
table A1. Variables related to entrepreneurial characteristics include age
(“CEO_age”), gender (“CEO_gender”), education (“CEO_edu”), and dis-
posable income (“CEO_income”) of the entrepreneur gained from the
firm. Table 1 shows that, on average, 68 percent of the assets of the firm
are owned by entrepreneurs. The average income of the entrepreneur, in-
cluding salaries and dividends gained in the previous year, is about RMB
240,000 (with a large standard deviation of RMB 414,390). Moreover, the
average age of the entrepreneur is 44 years, and 85.9 percent have high
school or higher education.
Variables related to firm characteristics include size (“Firm_size”) and
age (“Firm_age”) of the firm, and whether the firm was privatized from
a former SOE (“Privatization”). Table 1 shows that the average firm age
is 7 years and the average firm size is 52 employees. Approximately 20 per-
cent of the firms in the sample are privatized.
We are also interested to see how political connections affect lobbying






Work_time (hours) 3,413 12.484 2.614 6.000 18.000
Lobby_hour (hours) 3,570 3.258 1.825 0 10.000
Mng_hour (hours) 3,696 7.507 2.552 2.000 14.000
Lobby_Rt 3,412 .264 .135 0 .667
Mng_Rt 3,412 .596 .152 .200 .909
Study_Rt 3,412 .140 .076 0 .750
Forced_fee/sales 1,982 .006 .017 0 .115
High_fee 1,982 .250 .433 0 1.000
CPC 3,446 .405 .491 0 1.000
CEO_share (%) 3,242 67.996 26.943 0 100.000
CEO_income (RMB 10,000) 3,404 23.976 41.439 1.000 300.000
CEO_age (years) 3,808 44.381 8.150 26.000 65.000
CEO_edu 3,815 .859 .348 0 1.000
Privatization 3,600 .203 .402 0 1.000
Firm_age (years) 3,690 7.052 4.443 1.000 20.000
Firm_size (log no. of employees) 3,572 3.854 1.550 .693 7.824
Anti-Corruption 3,837 .282 .069 .151 .492
CVRG 3,772 59.453 30.921 2 132
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ity of the lobbying efforts to property rights violation. We measure entre-
preneurs’ political connections by their party membership with a dummy
variable, “CPC,” that it is equal to one if the entrepreneur is a Communist
Party of China (CPC) member at the time of the survey and zero other-
wise. Approximately 41 percent of the firms in our sample are owned by
CPC members. Moreover, nearly 80 percent of these CPC member entre-
preneurs are veteran party members who joined the party and cultivated
political connections with the government long before establishing a pri-
vate business.
Table 2 presents the comparison of all the variables of our interest be-
tween the group of firms that are charged high fees and those that are not
charged high fees, along with the t-tests. On average, firms being charged
high fees pay 2.3 percent of their total sales as levies, while the ratio for the
counterpart firms is 0.06 percent, and this difference is statistically signif-
icant. Moreover, these two groups are significantly different in other as-
pects. In particular, on average, entrepreneurs of firms that are charged
high fees allocatemore time to working activities and then spend a higher
proportion of their working time on lobbying activities and a lower pro-
portion of working time to management activities than the others. More-
over, bigger firms and privatized former SOEs are less likely to have high
fees imposed on them than the others. Furthermore, entrepreneurs of
the high-fee firms are more likely to be younger and less likely to be polit-
ically connected.
V. Empirical Findings
A. Property Rights Institution and Time Allocation
To investigate the impact of property rights protection on time allocation
of entrepreneurs systematically, we estimate the following equation:
Time_ratioi 5 a 1 bHigh_feei 1 dX i 1 εi , (8)
where Time_ratioi measures the proportion of time spent by entrepre-
neur i for various activities, including Lobby_Rt, the lobbying time/total
working time ratio; Mng_Rt, the management time/total working time
ratio; andWork_time, the total working hours spent by the entrepreneur.
Here, High_feei is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the levy/sales
ratio for firm i in the previous year (i.e., 2005) is in the top 25 percent and
zero otherwise. The term Xi is a vector of control variables for firm i and
includes characteristics of both the entrepreneur and the firm.
Table 3 presents our baseline regression estimations. Column 1 reports
(in the first row) the effects of charging high fees (i.e., High_fee5 1) to
entrepreneurs on their choice of total working hours. No statistically sig-
nificant relationship is observed betweenHigh_fee and total working hours.
Hence, property rights protection may not affect the time allocation be-
tweenwork and leisure in general.However, column2 shows thatHigh_fee














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is positively and significantly correlated with Lobby_Rt. On average, entre-
preneurs whohave to pay higher levies normally allocate about 1.9 percent
(about 7 percent of the mean) more time to lobbying activities than those
paying lower levies. Column 3 illustrates that Mng_Rt is negatively and sig-
nificantly correlated with High_fee, indicating that higher levies signifi-
cantly reduce the time allocated to managing business. On average, entre-
preneurs who have to pay higher levies normally allot about 2.2 percent
(about 4 percent of the mean) less time to management activities. These
results indicate that, everything else being equal, entrepreneurs facingmore
severe violation of property rights spend significantlymore time on lobby-
ing activities, at a cost to management time. This result is consistent with
the prediction of hypothesis 1 of our model.
To cross-check the results of our estimations, we include the absolute
amount of lobbying and management time allotted by entrepreneurs,
as seen in columns 4 and 5, respectively, of table 3. The variable High_fee
is significantly and negatively associated with the number of hours allot-
ted to management time, implying that entrepreneurs who need to pay
higher levies normally reduce time for management activities. Moreover,
TABLE 3











High_fee 2.173 .019** 2.022** .186 2.497***
(.169) (.009) (.010) (.121) (.164)
CEO_share .004 28.48E25 3.06E24** 4.60E24 .005**
(.003) (1.42E24) (1.56E24) (.002) (.003)
CEO_income 2.004** 3.08E24*** 24.19E24*** .003** 2.008***
(.002) (8.36E25) (9.16E25) (.001) (.002)
CEO_age .016* 2.001** .001** 2.008 .027***
(.010) (4.99E24) (.001) (.007) (.009)
CEO_gender 2.276 2.030*** .030** 2.448*** .212
(.217) (.011) (.012) (.156) (.212)
Firm_age .026 3.37E24 3.94E24 .012 .018
(.017) (.001) (.001) (.013) (.017)
CEO_edu .298 .006 2.015 .038 .052
(.207) (.011) (.012) (.149) (.201)
Privatization .194 2.007 3.33E24 .059 .011
(.183) (.010) .011 (.133) (.180)
Firm_size .136** .007** 2.009*** .131*** 2.019
(.056) (.003) (.003) (.041) (.055)
Constant 10.84*** .303*** .545*** 3.305*** 5.853***
(.610) (.032) (.035) (.441) (.600)
Industry effect Y Y Y Y Y
Regional effect Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,473 1,488
Pseudo-R 2 .009 2.057 2.083 .011 .012
p -value .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < .105.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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although not statistically significantly, High_fee and the number of hours
spent lobbying activities are positively correlated.
Table 3 further reveals interesting findings on the relationship between
time allocation and characteristics of the firm and the entrepreneur. First,
in general, entrepreneurs receiving higher compensation spend less time
onwork but allot a larger part of their work time to lobbying activities than
others. Second, we observe that entrepreneurs of larger-sized firms allot
more time towork than those of smaller firms in general and spend ahigher
proportion of work time on lobbying activities and a lower proportion of
work time on management activities. A potential explanation for these
findings is that entrepreneurs who havemore wealth choose to allotmore
time to leisure than work. Given the weak property rights protection, the
marginal benefits of lobbying efforts may be higher for those who have
greater wealth and larger firms than for entrepreneurs with lesser wealth
and smaller firms.
Moreover, asminor points of this paper, we observe that older entrepre-
neurs tend to allot more time to work and allocate a higher ratio of their
work time tomanagement activities than younger entrepreneurs. Thismay
reflect a change in the lifestyle of different generations in terms of work
and leisure choice. Finally, although no statistically significant difference
is reported between female andmale entrepreneurs in terms of their allo-
cation of time between work and leisure, we observe that female entrepre-
neurs allocatedmore time tomanagement and less time to lobbying activ-
ities than male entrepreneurs.
To test the robustness of our definition of High_fee, we attempted dif-
ferent cutoffs around 25 percent (i.e., 20, 23, 28, 30, 33, and 35 percent).
The results of our estimations basically remained robust (results are pro-
vided by request).
B. Identification Strategies
In the previous subsection, we report that violation of property rights is as-
sociated with an increase in lobbying time and a decrease in management
time. Yet there are alternative competing interpretations to the observed
correlation. Hence, we discuss identification strategies in this subsection,
including concerns on issues such as reverse causality and omitted vari-
ables.
First, in principle, we are not too concerned with reverse-causality is-
sues because of the nature of the survey data. All financial information,
including imposed fees, reported in the survey is based on the informa-
tion for the previous financial year, whereas time allocation information
is based on the average in the recent few months. Hence, the gap in tim-
ing for the information of the two variables implies that the levies and
fees imposed on the firms cannot be results of time allocation.
However, identification concerns related to omitted variables may re-
main. Although we have controlled a set of variables to control character-
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istics of entrepreneurs and firms and region and industry effects, certain
unobservable factors that potentially affect time allocation may still be
omitted. For instance, the family background or social values of the entre-
preneurmay be coincidentally correlated to additional levies imposed on
the entrepreneurial firm. Thus, it is plausible that the significant relation-
ship we observed between the variableHigh_fee and time allocationmight
be driven by unobservable factors rather than by property rights violation.
To address the potential identification concerns, we use 2-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimation to identify the effects of violation of property
rights. In particular, we use two IVs to identify whether the firm is more
likely to be charged with high fees. By using two IVs, we can test the rel-
evancies between the IVs and ourmajor explanatory variable and also test
the exogeneity of the IVs from the error terms of our estimations affect-
ing the dependent variables.
Our first IV is the weight of provincial-government policies on nonstate
sectors,measured by the frequency of the keyword “nonpublic-sector devel-
opment” in articles written by party chiefs of provincial party committees
in the 2 years before the survey, denoted “CVRG.”The data are covered by
theDatabase ofChineseCommunist PartyConstructionPeriodicals (Zhong-
gong Dang jian Qikan Shujuku), which is the largest database of digitized
CPC periodicals. The database covers 215 major CPC periodicals starting
from 1994.Most periodicals in the database are published by party commit-
tees at the provincial and municipality levels.22 The subnational-level party
periodicals are themajor platform throughwhichprovincial andmunicipal
party committees promote policies within their jurisdictions. This IV satis-
fies the two conditions of exogeneity and relevance. First, the frequency
of the keywords “nonpublic-sector development”used by the party chief im-
plies the extent towhich the provincial-level CPCcommittee prioritizes and
supports the development of the private sector, which is usually the largest
component in the officially so-called nonpublic sector. Thus, we expect that
in provinces where provincial party chiefs place significant emphasis on the
nonpublic sector, property rights are better protected in general and entre-
preneurs are less likely be charged high fees. However, the frequency of the
phrase “nonpublic-sector development” used by the CPC chief of the prov-
ince should not be related to error terms related to the time allocation of
individual entrepreneurs.
The second IV is Anti-Corruption, which refers to the number of reg-
istered cases under the direct investigation of provincial procuratorates,
divided by the provincial population (cases per 100,000 persons). We col-
lect data for cases 2 years before the survey was conducted. Data are ob-
tained from the Procuratorial Yearbook of China (2004 and 2005). The num-
ber of corruption cases under provincial procuratorate’s investigation is a
good indicator of the seriousness of a province in fighting corruption in
22 It also covers several dozen national-level CPC periodicals published by the CPC cen-
tral agencies, such as Qiushi, Dangjian, and Hongqi.
Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation 413
the 2 years before the survey. Assuming that the indicator Anti-Corruption
proxies for the provincial governments’ anticorruption efforts (Cole, El-
liott, andZhang 2009), we expect that provinces fighting corruptionmore
seriously protect property rights and that entrepreneurs are less likely to
be charged high fees. Yet provincial-level anticorruption efforts should
not be related to error terms that affect time allocation of the individual
entrepreneurs.
Table 4 reports the 2SLS regression results whenHigh_fee is applied in
the two IVs. Panel A of table 4 presents the results from first-stage estima-
tions. It suggests that the two IVs are satisfactory instruments. First, both
CVRGandAnti-Corruption are significantly and negatively correlated with
the dummy variable High_fee, confirming the relevance of the two IVs we
used. The results of the Sargan tests indicate that both IVs are exogenous
from unobserved factors thatmay affect individual time allocation. The re-
sults of the second-stage estimation are presented in panel B of table 4.
It shows that the instrumented High_fee is positively and significantly re-
lated to Lobby_Rt and negatively and significantly related to Mng_Rt.
Supported by the evidence presented in tables 3 and 4, we claim that
hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. That is, violation of property rights re-
duces entrepreneurs’ management time. Moreover, the weaker the pro-
tection of property rights, the more likely it is that the entrepreneur de-
votes more time to lobbying activities, at a cost to management efforts.
C. Political Connections and Time Allocation
Hypothesis 2 of our model predicts that politically connected entrepre-
neurs are more efficient than others in using their lobbying time. Thus,
they save more of their time for management. Approximately 40 percent
of the firms in our sample are owned by CPCmembers. Moreover, nearly
80 percent of theseCPCmember entrepreneurs are veteranpartymembers,
meaning that they joined theparty and cultivatedpolitical connections with
the government long before starting a private business. Therefore, CPC
membership is a good proxy for political connection and exogenous to
time allocation. This condition allows us to explore the effects of political
connections on time allocation. For this purpose, we specify the regres-
sion models as
Time_ratioi 5 a 1 bHigh_feei 1 vCPCi
1 m CPCi  High_feeið Þ 1 dX i 1 εi , (9)
whereCPCi is themeasurement of political connection, that is, CPCmem-
bership of entrepreneur i. Our major interest is the interaction term be-
tween CPC and High_fee, that is, CPC  High_fee.
Table 5 presents the estimation results, which indicate the absence of a
statistically significant relationship between CPC and any time allocation
variables. Yet the interaction term CPC  High_fee is significantly and
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negatively correlated with Lobby_Rt and significantly and positively corre-
lated withMng_Rt. These results suggest that, everything else being equal,
politically connected entrepreneurs spend relatively less time lobbying to
deal with property rights violation than other entrepreneurs do. As a re-
sult, politically connected entrepreneurs save more time in management
than others when others have to spend more time dealing with property
rights violation. On average, politically connected entrepreneurs charged
TABLE 4












Anti-Corruption 22.161* 22.161* 22.161* 22.198* 22.269**
(1.158) (1.158) (1.158) (1.137) (1.122)
CVRG 2.007** 2.007** 2.007** 2.006** 2.006**
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
All control variables Y Y Y Y Y
p -value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Anderson canonical
correction LM statistics .063 .063 .063 .065 .049
Sargan statistics .014 .190 .276 .108 .428












High_fee .650 .303* 2.348* 4.173* 24.186
(2.607) (.182) (.204) (2.559) (2.867)
CEO_share .004 22.58E24 .001** 2.002 .008**
(.003) (2.19E24) (2.45E24) (.003) (.004)
CEO_income 2.004* 1.71E24 22.63E24 .001 2.005**
(.002) (1.45E24) (1.63E24) (.002) (.002)
CEO_age .017* 2.001 .001 2.003 .021*
(.010) (.001) (.001) (.010) (.011)
CEO_gender 2.215 2.020 .018 2.312 .083
(.227) (.020) (.018) (.220) (.258)
Firm_age .022 1.74E25 .001 .004 .024
(.017) (.001) (.001) (.017) (.020)
CEO_edu .310 .004 2.012 .029 .043
(.205) (.014) (.016) (.196) (.228)
Privatization .212 .008 2.016 .247 2.181
(.222) (.016) (.017) (.216) (.261)
Firm_size .173 .020** 2.024** .306** 2.179
(.135) (.010) (.011) (.128) (.145)
Constant 10.44*** .175* .691*** 1.598 7.487***
(1.284) (.090) (.101) (1.219) (1.386)
Industry effect Y Y Y Y Y
Regional effect Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,430 1,430 1,430 1,464 1,479
Prob > F .0017 .0204 .003 .0692 .001
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses. LM: Lagrange multiplier.
* p < .105.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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higher levies spend approximately 3 percent less of their time lobbying
(about 11 percent of the mean) than others. At the same time, these en-
trepreneurs allocate 4.4 percent more of their time at work on manage-
ment (about 7.4 percent of themean) than others. The estimation results
shown in table 5 are consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 2. Thus,
this result confirms that political connections may increase firm-level effi-
ciency for lobbying activities and reduce the marginal inputs of lobbying
efforts when property rights are violated.
D. Firm Characteristics, Property Rights, and Time Allocation
In this subsection, we further analyze how the age and size of firms affect
entrepreneurs’ lobbying efficiency under weak property rights protection.
First, entrepreneurs of older firms may have accumulated more connec-
tions with local governments than entrepreneurs of younger firms. These
connections may also increase firm-level lobbying efficiency for protect-
TABLE 5











High_fee 2.285 .031*** 2.040*** .322** 2.848***
(.221) (.012) (.013) (.157) (.214)
CPC 2.169 .001 2.001 2.020 2.137
(.177) (.009) (.010) (.127) (.173)
CPC  High_fee .220 2.030* .044** 2.358 .828**
(.357) (.018) (.020) (.255) (.345)
CEO_share .004 25.94E25 2.67E24* .001 .005*
(.003) (1.47E24) (1.60E24) (.002) (.003)
CEO_income 2.004** 2.92E24*** 24.14E24*** .002** 2.007***
(.002) (8.52E25) (9.32E25) (.001) (.002)
CEO_age .017* 2.001* .001** 2.007 .027***
(.010) (.001) (.001) (.007) (.010)
CEO_gender 2.228 2.031*** .033*** 2.432*** .290
(.226) (.012) (.013) (.162) (.219)
Firm_age .025 .001 23.62E24 .022* .008
(.018) (.001) (.001) (.013) (.018)
CEO_edu .350 .014 2.025** .145 2.052
(.219) (.011) (.012) (.156) (.211)
Privatization .251 2.005 2.001 .096 .046
(.193) (.010) (.011) (.139) (.189)
Firm_size .133** .006* 2.007** .113*** 2.002
(.058) (.003) (.003) (.042) (.056)
Constant 10.950*** .298*** .550*** 3.265*** 5.992***
(.633) (.033) (.036) (.454) (.617)
Industry effect Y Y Y Y Y
Regional effect Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,354 1,354 1,354 1,386 1,400
Pseudo-R 2 .009 2.063 2.093 .012 .013
p -value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < .105.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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ing each firm’s property rights. Therefore, we expect that, everything else
being equal, entrepreneurs of older firmsmay spend less time in lobbying
against property rights violation. Second, the size of the firm may matter.
Under the regionally decentralized authoritarian regime in China, com-
petition between regional officials at the same level is an essential part of
the cadre management system (Xu 2011). Larger firms may have higher
value for local governments, which may help entrepreneurs to bargain
with local governments when high levies are imposed. Economic growth
and social stability are the most important performance assessment crite-
ria for local-government officers in the economic-reform era. When a re-
gion has higher economic growth and fewer social conflicts, the head of
the region will enjoy greater power and have higher chances of being pro-
moted (Xu2011). Larger firms that can contributemore to localGDPand
provide more jobs to local communities are thus of higher value for local-
government officers. Therefore, the lobbying efficiency of large-firm en-
trepreneurs may be higher than that of the others.
The specification of the regression models is
Timeratioi 5 a 1 bHigh_feei 1 qFeaturei
1 h Featurei  High_feeið Þ 1 dX 0i 1 εi , (10)
where Featurei refers to the characteristics of firm i, including firm age
and firm size; Featurei  High_feei is the interaction term between the
characteristics of firm i and the levy imposed on firm i; and X 0i is a vector
of control variables.
Table 6 reports the estimation results. Columns 1–3 present the effects
of firm age and the interaction term between firm age andHigh_fee. Col-
umns 4–6 report the effects of firm size and its interaction term.Column2
of table 6 shows that the relationship between High_fee and Lobby_Rt
remains positive and significant. The interaction term Firm_ageHigh_
fee is negatively and significantly correlated with Lobby_Rt, whereas no
statistically significant relationship is observed between Firm_age and
Lobby_Rt. These results imply that among all the entrepreneurs who are
charged high levies, those with older firms spend a smaller proportion
of working time in lobbying than others did. Column 3 shows a significant
reduction in Mng_Rt associated with High_fee, whereas Firm_age and
Firm_age  High_fee have no significant impact on management time.
The results of columns 1–3 suggest that firm age may affect the sensitivity
of entrepreneurs’ lobbying efforts to property rights violation, because
when firms grow older, entrepreneurs accumulatemore connections with
local governments, which complement their lobbying activities. However,
firm age has no significant impact on the sensitivity of their management
efforts to property rights violation.
Exploring the features of firm sizes, column 5 of table 6 shows that
bothHigh_fee and Firm_size are positively and significantly correlatedwith


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lobby_Rt. The relationship between Firm_size  High_fee and Lobby_Rt
is negative and significant. As to the impact onmanagement time, column6
shows that bothHigh_fee andFirm_size arenegatively and significantly cor-
related withMng_Rt, whereas Firm_sizeHigh_fee is positively and signif-
icantly associated with Mng_Rt. These results reconfirm our earlier estima-
tions that weaker property rights protection induces entrepreneurs to exert
more effort toward lobby activities and reduce the proportion of time allo-
cated to management activities. The larger the firm, the more lobbying ef-
fort is required, because the stakes of protecting property rights are higher.
However, when the firm is larger, the value of the firm to the local govern-
ment may be higher. Consistent with our predictions, when high levies are
imposed on a firm, firm size may moderate the relationship between the
property rights violation and time allocation at work. That is, under weaker
property rights protection, the higher the value of a firm is to local govern-
ments, the more likely the entrepreneur of the firm has more bargaining
power with local governments. Hence, this condition increases lobbying ef-
ficiency, and the entrepreneur may reduce lobbying time and save more
time to deal with daily management activities.
VI. Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature by providing systematic microevi-
dence on the effects of institutions on entrepreneurs’ time or effort allo-
cation, particularly on the effects of the violation of property rights on en-
trepreneurs’ effort allocation. To our knowledge, the empirical evidence
we provide on the interactions between institutions and entrepreneur
allocationofworking effort is the first of its type in the literature. This study
analytically extends Becker’s (1965) model by adding institutional con-
straints. This framework allows us to analyze a concrete mechanism, both
theoretically and empirically, for why the violation of property rights re-
duces firm efficiencies (e.g., North 1981; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005).
Employing a nationwide random-sample survey of more than 3,000 en-
trepreneurs in over 100 cities, we find microevidence that when the gov-
ernment violates private property rights by imposing high arbitrary fees,
entrepreneurs spendmore time lobbying the government for protection,
substantially reducing their management time. Moreover, politically con-
nected entrepreneurs are better protected thanothers, such that they spend
less time lobbying and are able to focus more on management activities.
Overall, we find that entrepreneurs have to exert extra effort in dealing
with institutional obstacles, at a cost to their time and effort for manage-
ment activities. Although the findings of this study are based on contem-
porary Chinese data, our discovery is general. This study confirms Adam
Smith’s ([1776] 1981) famous proposition that weak property rights hin-
der entrepreneurship.





Time allocation of the
entrepreneur:
Work_time Average working hours per day in the recent months
reported by the entrepreneur, including learning
time, lobbying time, and management time
Lobby_hour Average time spent by the entrepreneur to deal with
networking activities in the recent months reported
by the entrepreneur
Mng_hour Average time spent by the entrepreneur to deal with
management and other administrative activities
of the firm in the recent months reported by the
entrepreneur
Study_hour Average time spent by the entrepreneur on learning in




Forced_fee Total additional levies imposed on the firm in the
previous financial year
High_fee Dummy variable that equals 1 if the ratio of the
Forced_fee to total sales of the previous year is in the
top 25 percent, 0 otherwise
Political connections of the
entrepreneur:
CPC Dummy variable that equals 1 if the entrepreneur was a
CPC member at the time of the survey, 0 otherwise
Entrepreneur characteristics:
CEO_share Ownership held by the entrepreneur divided by total
equity of the firm in the previous financial year
CEO_age Age of the entrepreneur in year at the time of the survey
CEO_edu Dummy variable that equals 1 if the entrepreneur has
high school education or above at the time of the
survey, 0 otherwise
CEO_gender Dummy variable that equals 1 if the entrepreneur is a
female, 0 otherwise
CEO_income Total income the entrepreneur gained from the firm in
the previous financial year
Firm characteristics:
Firm_age Age of the firm in years at the time of the survey
Firm_size Total number of employees of the firm in logarithm
form
Privatization Dummy variable that equals 1 if the private firm was
privatized from a former state-owned enterprise,
0 otherwise
Instrumental variables:
Anti-Corruption Number of registered cases under the direct investiga-
tion of people’s procuratorates, divided by provincial
population (cases per 10,000 persons) in the 2 years
before the survey
CVRG Frequency of the appearance of the keyword “nonpublic-
sector development” in articles written by
the party chief of a specified province in the 2 years
before the survey and covered by the Database of
Chinese Communist Party Construction Periodicals
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